In response to 9/11 and the increasing concerns over chemical sector security, Congress gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) the authority to regulate the safety and security of U.S. chemical facilities. In April of 2007, DHS passed the interim final rule called the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) in order to secure the U.S. chemical infrastructure. Unfortunately, the latest update on CFATS progress by DHS indicated that very few chemical facilities have completed the CFATS process. The slow implementation of CFATS perpetuates the inherent vulnerabilities of U.S. chemical infrastructure and does not augur well for the safety and security of the U.S. population. We argue that collaboration between DHS and the chemical industry can help to speed up CFATS and that communities should not wait for CFATS to ramp up before developing preparedness and response plans in anticipation of future chemical disasters.
Introduction
The chemical sector is a vital part of the U.S. economy; it makes up approximately 1.9 per cent of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and it is the nation's greatest exporter (Spellman and Bieber, 2009 ). In addition, the chemical sector contributes to the products of many other sectors of the economy including the manufacturing of automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and agricultural products, amongst others. According to KPMG (2010) , the U.S. chemical industry directly employs 800,000 people and is responsible for another 5.5 million jobs that are supported indirectly through related activities. As an important player in the U.S. economy, the chemical industry is also considered one of the critical infrastructures, as stated in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (2009) . Critical infrastructure, more specifically, is any material asset that is essential to the operations of an economy and government (Spellman and Bieber, 2009) . Critical infrastructure thus span many sectors, including agriculture, banking and finance, chemical materials, transportation, etc. What distinguishes the chemical industry from some of the other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States is that it is considered vulnerable, i.e. it can be exploited to cause harm to society and the system in general (Lippin et al, 2006; Spellman and Bieber, 2009 ).
To make matters worse, the vulnerabilities of U.S. chemical sector are exacerbated by the close proximity of some chemical facilities to highly populated areas. For example, a study conducted by the Center for American Progress notes that "More than 80 million Americans live within range of a catastrophic chemical release from at least one of the 101 most hazardous chemical facilities" (Orum, 2008 p 3) . Perhaps, as a result of these vulnerabilities, terrorists are interested in attacking this sector (Department of Justice (DOJ), 2000) . Terrorists may either attack a chemical facility directly with the goal of causing destruction to the facility and surrounding communities or with the goal of stealing chemicals that would be used to carry out attacks elsewhere (Stephenson, 2005; Schierow, 2006) . In recognition of the possibility of chemical attacks against the chemical sector, the federal government has taken some steps to reduce the risk of chemical terrorism (Spellman and Bieber, 2009 ) by creating planning scenarios and passing some regulations. For example, four of the fifteen National Planning Scenarios are related to chemical attacks (Howe, 2004) . Regulations to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. chemical facilities include, but are not limited to, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). While CFATS is a good idea conceptually, its implementation is fraught with many problems according to an internal review done by Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) (Sadiq and McCreight, 2013) . One perturbing problem which Congress, the chemical industry, industry trade associations, etc., agree on is the slow pace of CFATS implementation (Sadiq, forthcoming) . Since 2007, ISCD has assigned 3,468 facilities to their final tier designations and of these, only 40 have had their plans approved (Beers and Wulf, 2013) . Against the backdrop of slow implementation, communities cannot afford to wait for CFATS to ramp up before taking protective action because terrorists might see this security lapse as an opportunity to strike. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 are vivid reminders that terrorists are capable of exploiting vulnerabilities. This is not to suggest that terrorist attacks pose a greater risk to chemical facilities than other types of hazards. As a matter of fact, accidents and natural hazards, for instance, tend to occur more frequently and result in a greater number of fatalities than terrorist attacks (Viscusi, 2009 
Background on CFATS
Despite the fact that several members of Congress expressed concern over the security of chemical facilities and hazardous chemicals, it was not until after the tragic events of 9/11 that Congress began taking actions to address these concerns. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, chemical security was practised on a voluntary basis by the chemical sector, with some organisations like the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA) making security a priority for their members (Allmond, 2012) . Chemical facilities pose a hazard to homeland security due to the large quantities of chemicals that they store and the potential for 1 An interim Final Rule, according to the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, is "a rule promulgated by an administrative agency that goes into effect when it is published, but will be open for public comment for a specific period of time and then potentially revised and issued as a final rule." Accessed http://sustainableagriculture.net/publications/grassrootsguide/glossary/.
release, theft or diversion, and sabotage and contamination of chemicals by terrorists (Shea, 2012) . In response to 9/11 and the concomitant increasing concerns over chemical sector Under the interim final rule, 322 chemicals were designated as "chemicals of interest"
(COI). Facilities that hold significant amounts of COI were asked to submit information to DHS, after which DHS determined preliminary risk levels of the facilities. Risk levels range from tier 1 (the highest risk level) to tier 4 (the lowest risk level) (Shea, 2012) . Once facilities are designated into tiers, they are asked to submit a Site Security Plan (SSP) or an Alternative Security Plan (ASP). DHS can either approve or reject the submitted SSPs or ASPs. A facility is considered compliant if DHS approved its SSP or ASP and the facility implements the approved SSP or ASP (Beers, 2012) .
In November of 2011, an internal document prepared by the Director of ISCD that brought attention to some inherent problems of CFATS was leaked to the public. In this document, it was revealed that ISCD had high turnover in management, low employee morale, issues with compliance inspections, and a lack of support from the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) and the National Program and Protection Directorate (NPPD) (Beers, 2012) , amongst other problems. As a result of these issues, none of the approximately 4000 SSPs that were submitted had been approved by DHS. In response to these problems and the need to address them, DHS developed a 94-item action plan to improve and track its progress (Caldwell, 2012) .
In September of 2012, Suzanne Spaulding, the Deputy Under Secretary of NPPD, and
David Wulf, Director of NPPD, reported that 68 out of the 94 action items were completed (Spaulding and Wulf, 2012) . Furthermore, in March of 2013, it was reported that ISCD had approved 36 tier 1 SSPs and ASPs and four tier 2 SSPs and ASPs (Beers and Wulf, 2013) .
Despite these improvements, GAO estimates that it will take ISCD another 7 to 9 years to complete tier assignments and review the remaining 3,120 site security plans (Caldwell, 2013) . Shea (2012) has drawn attention to another CFATS problem that is relevant to this paper -the Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) System. CVI is information that is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and other similar laws (Waugh and Streib, 2006) , including the "Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act" (EPCRA) (Shea, 2012) . According to DHS (2008b) , both the Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs) and the SSPs are considered CVI. This means that only authorised individuals have access to this information. An authorised individual is "any person who has completed DHS online CVI training, which includes obtaining an Authorized User number, or equivalent measures approved by DHS; and complied with any background checks or other requirements for personal identification or trustworthiness that DHS may require under 6 CFR § § 27.400(e)(2)(iii), and 27.400(e)(3)" (DHS, 2008) . One issue that arises from CVI is that unauthorised emergency managers will lack important information on the vulnerability of chemical facilities in their communities. This information, which local emergency managers cannot obtain through EPCRA or FOIA, is necessary to properly plan for potential chemical disasters. For example, if a chemical disaster were to occur, a lack of access to the SSPs may result in duplication of efforts and consequently, a slow response time.
Chemical Terrorism and Chemical Facility Vulnerabilities
In this section, past and foiled terrorist attacks involving the use of chemicals in the U.S. is discussed using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and The Heritage Foundation. We also discuss the exacerbation of U.S. vulnerability resulting from the location of chemical companies near the 10 largest U.S. cities using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and Greenpeace USA. fatalities, 1,000 hospitalisations, contamination of the environment, and billions of dollars in economic loss (Howe, 2012) . In addition to this, table 2 demonstrates that there have been several attempts by terrorists to carry out attacks using chemicals since 9/11. Although, these four plots were foiled, they are strong indication that the threat of chemical terrorism is real and ongoing. 
Need for Enhanced Collaboration
In this section, we discuss the need for collaboration in critical infrastructure, homeland security and emergency management in general and chemical security and CFATS in particular.
According to a working group that consisted of emergency management practitioners and academics, collaboration involves establishing and maintaining "broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication" . Collaboration amongst homeland security and emergency management actors provides a solid foundation for mitigating, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from natural and man-made disasters (Waugh and Streib, 2006) . In this paper, collaboration is the "mutual agreement to work together on the same task" (Kapucu and Garayev, 2011) , whereby the results of the group working together are better than any one member would have accomplished alone.
There is no denying the fact that the federal government is interested in protecting critical infrastructures through public-private partnerships. For instance, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate (2011) said, "We cannot separate out and segment one sector in isolation; the interdependencies are too great.… We want the private sector to be part of the team and we want to be in the situation where we work as a team and not compete with each other". DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano concurs with Craig Fugate by noting that "programs such as the "If You See Something, Say Something™" public awareness campaign and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting initiative highlight the importance of public-private partnerships in reporting suspicious activity to local law enforcement and underscore that security is a shared responsibility" (DHS, 2011). Public-private partnerships are defined as commitments by governments and private businesses to work together to achieve shared objectives for the delivery of public services and infrastructure (World Bank, 2013 All disasters are local (Dynes et al, 1972) and so communities must build their capacity to respond to chemical disasters within their borders because if a chemical release were to occur, the federal government may not be able to marshal its resources for hours or even days (Waugh and Streib, 2006) . The National Response Framework (NRF) makes this point very clear by noting that, "Each organization or level of government therefore has an imperative to fund and execute its own core emergency management responsibilities" (DHS, 2008a).
Due to a lack of financial resources, local governments are not able to invest adequately in emergency management programmes. Nonetheless, the repercussions of not taking action to protect citizens from a potential chemical release can be enormous in the form of fatalities, injuries, and environmental degradation. Against this backdrop of insufficient resources at the local level, it is crucial for the local emergency management offices to collaborate with chemical facility owners, local public health departments, and first responders to build the capacity (e.g., through mutual aid agreements and joint exercises) necessary to prepare for, respond to, and recover from future chemical disasters (Waugh and Straub, 2006) .
Recommendations

Recommendations for Speeding up CFATS
If DHS and the chemical industry are able to establish a successful collaborative relationship, they stand to benefit immensely. First, collaboration can lead to trust between DHS and the chemical industry and trust might in turn lead to more transparency from DHS and more compliance from chemical facilities. Second, with collaboration, it may be relatively easier for DHS and chemical facilities to work hand-in-hand to achieve an effective response to chemical disasters (Waugh and Sadiq, 2011; Waugh and Streib, 2006) . And finally, collaboration can lead to better coordination of personnel and resources when responding to and recovering from chemical disasters. on CFATS design and implementation. Such a repository for multiple perspectives would benefit both parties. Of particular importance would be the inputs from CFATS compliant facilities who could share information on best practices and problems they encountered during the CFATS process. Furthermore, DHS can share information on the "do's" and "don'ts" of inspections and basic information about facilities, without revealing identifying and sensitive information about facilities that have gone through the CFATS process. In so doing, chemical facilities may be able to adapt the lessons and best practices to fit their specific needs and in the process, help to speed up CFATS.
In order for these specific recommendations to work, we suggest that Congress include a mandate within CFATS that will require DHS to collaborate with the chemical industry in both the design of CFATS (e.g., the use of the RBPS methodology to assign chemical facilities to tiers) and the implementation of CFATS (e.g., during inspections). Such a mandate, which is currently non-existent, would allow DHS to invest in meaningful collaborative initiatives with the chemical industry, thus speeding up CFATS.
Recommendations for Helping Communities to Improve Their Capacities to Deal with Chemical Disasters
We recommend that communities with chemical facilities must be prepared for a potential quantities of chemicals present in a chemical facility that is ablaze, it would be difficult for fire fighters to know the appropriate strategy to adopt in putting out the fire (Sadiq and McCreight, 2013 located in their communities and a lack of funding. We recommend that local emergency managers get CVI certification and also collaborate with local public health departments, private entities, and non-profit organisations to raise funds and build the capacity needed to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from potential chemical disasters.
There are several limitations to our analysis. First, our paper focuses primarily on the slow implementation of CFATS by DHS and thereby ignores many of the other CFATS problems -organisational culture, employee morale, and administrative issues-that were made known in the ISCD internal report that was leaked in 2011 (Beers, 2012 and the RBPSs. In addition, researchers should examine CFATS-Share more closely to determine how it can be better utilised to increase collaboration between DHS and the chemical industry. Despite the limitations of this paper, the authors hope that this paper will help to stimulate discussions and spur research in the homeland security, emergency management, and critical infrastructure communities with the goal of speeding up CFATS and contributing to the safety of the chemical industry and the country as a whole.
